Divide and Rule: Redistribution in a Model with Differentiated Candidates by Matakos, Konstantinos & Xefteris, Dimitrios
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
DOI:
10.1007/s00199-016-0967-2
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Matakos, K., & Xefteris, D. (2016). Divide and Rule: Redistribution in a Model with Differentiated Candidates.
ECONOMIC THEORY. 10.1007/s00199-016-0967-2
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 18. Feb. 2017
Econ Theory
DOI 10.1007/s00199-016-0967-2
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Divide and rule: redistribution in a model with
differentiated candidates
Konstantinos Matakos1 · Dimitrios Xefteris2
Received: 20 December 2014 / Accepted: 16 March 2016
© The Author(s) 2016. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract We study an electoral competition model in which each voter is charac-
terized by income level and non-economic characteristics, and where two vote share
maximizing candidates, with fixed non-economic characteristics (differentiated can-
didates), strategically promise a level of redistribution.We prove existence of a unique
Nash equilibriumwhich is characterized by policy convergence or divergence depend-
ing on whether candidates redistribution technologies are symmetric or not. Perhaps
more importantly, we show that, independently of whether the equilibrium is conver-
gent or divergent, there are three predominant effects on equilibrium tax rates: the
group-size effect (the larger an income group, the larger its influence on equilibrium
tax rate), the income effect (poor voters are more responsive to a redistributive trans-
fer) and the within-group homogeneity effect (the degree to which voters of the same
income group have similar non-economic characteristics). The latter drags redistrib-
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ution toward the preferred level of redistribution of the less “divided”—in terms of
non-economic characteristics—income group and may dominate over the other two.
Keywords Redistributive politics · Inequality ·Taxation ·Differentiated candidates ·
Within-group homogeneity · Identity
JEL Classification D72 · H20
“…and the result which follows in democracies is that the poor are more sovereign than the rich, for they
are in a majority, and the will of the majority is sovereign.”
Aristotle (Politics VI.2, 1317a40)
1 Introduction
Over the past three decades, income inequality has steadily risen in many democracies
and the middle class has become relatively poorer (Piketty and Saez 2003; Atkinson
et al. 2011). Yet, in contrast with the predictions of economic theory of democracy
(Downs 1957) that the democratic process will eventually reflect the preferences of the
majority, rich voters’ preferences for less redistribution seem to be better represented.
As many observers note (e.g., Bonica et al. 2013), while the majority of voters has
become poorer (in relative terms) one does not observe majority’s preferences over
taxation and redistribution beingmet by politicians (Fig. 1).1 But how is it possible that
democratic politics end up in such representation gaps? Since politicians compete for
votes why is it not the case that they converge to promising the level of redistribution
that the majority of voters prefers?
Standard models of redistributive politics (Meltzer and Richard 1981; Cox and
McCubbins 1986; Alesina and Rodrik 1994; Persson and Tabellini 2001; Roemer
2005; Benhabib and Przeworski 2006) cannot explain the empirical puzzle described
above as they predict median-preferred equilibrium levels of redistribution: as the
median becomes poorer, redistribution is predicted to increase. In all those models,
the relative size of poor versus rich voters drives the result as politicians will always
pander to the relatively larger group—we call this the group-size effect. Models of
special interest politics, on the other hand, consider that parties use redistribution
in order to “woo those [poor] voters who are relatively more responsive to generous
transfers” (Dixit andLondregan1996).Wecall this the incomeeffect. Thus both groups
of models predict that the equilibrium redistribution level will reflect the preferences
of poor voters. In the opposite direction, models assuming that rich voters are more
involved in politics or finance candidates’ campaigns (e.g., Campante 2011) may
indeed explain part of the phenomenon, but they cannot fully account for the sharp
decline in redistribution (taxation) that is observed since the income share of most of
the engaged voters is decreasing as well.2
1 For more evidence from European countries see also Rosset et al. (2013).
2 Lower voter turnout among the very poor voters (bottom quintile) cannot alone account for this paradox
as the third and fourth quintiles have seen their relative income shares constantly shrinking over the last
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In this study, we provide an alternative explanation to this paradox by the means of
a two-dimensional electoral competition model with differentiated candidates:3 voters
are characterized by income and a fixed non-economic characteristic (which can be
thought of as ethnic, religious or cultural identity) and two candidates with also fixed
non-economic characteristics strategically choose redistribution schemes in order to
maximize their expected vote shares. In themain part of the paper, we focus on a case in
which candidates have symmetric redistribution technologies. In specific, we consider
that each candidate proposes a Meltzer and Richard (1981) balanced-budget redistri-
bution scheme and we prove existence of a unique Nash equilibrium—conditional on
candidates being sufficiently differentiated in non-economic characteristics—which
is characterized by policy convergence.4 We then focus on understanding how differ-
four decades (Fig. 1). That is, the demand for redistribution should have been higher even among those
“upper-middle” class voters (third and fourth quintile) who tend to be more involved into politics.
3 For a general presentation of differentiated candidates’ models, one is referred to Krasa and Polborn
(2010a, b, 2012) and Dziubin´ski and Roy (2011).
4 The fact that we prove existence of a unique Nash equilibrium under fairly plausible conditions in such
a model is, to our view, a distinct contribution of the paper since relevant studies: (a) either refrain from
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ent elements of the model affect this unique equilibrium tax rate. In our equilibrium,
both described effects (the group-size effect and the income effect) are present but a
third—and potentially dominant over the other two—factor appears: the within-group
homogeneity effect.
Consider a simple example in which voters of two income groups (poor and rich)
have preferences over a unidimensional non-economic issue: for example, the darkness
of the skin of the candidate.5 If poor voters are many but divided in this dimension
(say half prefer darker skins to paler ones and half prefer paler skins to darker), if rich
voters are few but homogeneous and moderate in this dimension and one candidate is
very dark while the other candidate is very pale, then the following force appears: the
dark candidate knows that by offering a redistribution scheme slightly less generous
than the pale candidate makes all rich voters vote for her (since rich voters do not
have strong preferences about skin color) at the cost of losing the votes of very few
poor voters (since poor voters have very strong feelings about the color, a marginal
difference between the proposed redistribution schemes is not enough to make them
switch their votes). This within-group homogeneity effect drives the equilibrium level
of redistribution closer to the preferences of the more homogeneous group—in this
example the rich voters’ group—despite the fact that poor voters constitute a majority.
We are particularly interested in studying the interaction between the three effects.
We initially show that when candidates’ fixed non-economic characteristics are iden-
tical, then the group-size effect is dominant: consistent with previous literature (e.g.,
Meltzer and Richard 1981) candidates pander to the interests of the majority. This
implies that redistribution will be high (low) when the majority of the society is poor
(rich). We further show that when candidates are sufficiently differentiated in the non-
economic dimension and when the degree of within-group homogeneity in the non-
economic dimension is identical across income groups, a representation gap appears
in favor of the poor voters: independently of the size of the group of poor voters, candi-
dates promise a large level of redistribution. In this case, the income effect is dominant.
But more strikingly, we find that the direction of the representation gap can be
quickly reversed in favor of the rich group when poor voters become more hetero-
geneous in the non-economic dimension. That is, by maintaining the assumption of
sufficient candidate differentiation, we show that even if poor voters are only slightly
more heterogeneous than the rich ones in the non-economic dimension, the equilibrium
redistribution schemewill better reflect the interests of the rich. Candidates, in general,
are found to pander to the interests of the most homogenous group, as the relative ratio
of the densities of the swing voters of the two income groups on the non-economic
dimension is found to be more relevant in determining equilibrium redistribution than
the ratio of the sizes of these groups. Hence the within-group homogeneity effect is
much stronger than the other two and presents itself as a possible explanation for the
paradox that we described in the beginning.
providing equilibrium existence conditions (Krasa and Polborn 2014a) or (b) provide conditions for equi-
librium existence that are very stringent (Lindbeck and Weibull 1987).
5 Anesi andDeDonder (2009) consider an analogous voter setup, where “…voters differ in their exogenous
income and in their ideological views, with racism as an illustration.”
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After analyzing the interplay between the three effects, we consider a generaliza-
tion of the model to a wide range of redistribution schemes, including asymmetric
ones. That is, we consider a general framework in which candidates are not only dif-
ferentiated in terms of their non-economic characteristics but also in terms of their
redistribution technologies. Consider, for example, the case in which candidates have
different abilities to provide different public goods that are more beneficial to the poor
or the rich, or the case in which one of the candidates can credibly promise to increase
voters’ welfare through outside funding.6 We show that, for a quite general class of
such asymmetries in redistribution technologies, a (possibly) divergent equilibrium—
with features similar to the ones in the main part of the paper—is guaranteed to exist
when candidates’ non-economic characteristics are sufficiently different. In particular,
we are able to prove that the within-group homogeneity effect is robust to candidates
being characterized by distinct redistribution technologies: as the poor become more
divided in non-economic characteristics compared to the rich, the tax rates proposed in
equilibrium by both candidates become lower. This finding unambiguously strength-
ens the empirical relevance of the analysis as it establishes that the described effect is
not an artifact of considering symmetric redistribution technologies.
Even though this paper merely aims to make a theoretical argument, real-world
observations seem to back existence of this within-group homogeneity effect. In the
USA, for example, the degree of polarization and heterogeneity in a series of non-
economic matters (e.g., ethnicity, religion, culture and social ideology) has been docu-
mented to have risen—both at the political elite level, especially across parties and can-
didates in Congress (Poole and Rosenthal 1984, 1985, 2000;McCarty et al. 2006) and
also among voters (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Harbridge and Malhotra 2011;
Krasa and Polborn 2014b), especially among the poorer ones.7 In turn, this has further
shifted the axis of political competition from class to identity. It is exactly this interplay
between increased candidate differentiation and greater within-poor heterogeneity that
incentivizes parties to pander to the relatively more homogenous rich voters—in the
absence of any of those two elements our model predicts that redistribution should
have been higher.Moreover our theoretical findings can speak to the literature of ethnic
politics by supplementing recent empirical findings (Alesina et al. 1999, 2001;Alesina
and Glaeser 2004) which suggest that there is more redistribution in ethnically (or cul-
turally) more homogenous societies despite the fact that in the latter inequality—and
the number of poor voters—might be smaller. Thus our findings offer a new insight
that future empirical research can explore in greater detail: it appears that relative
ethnic homogeneity within income groups is potentially a more relevant determinant
of redistribution than the overall (aggregate) level of ethnic homogeneity in a society.
In terms of modeling assumptions, there are two papers which are very close to
ours. The first one is Lindbeck and Weibull (1987). In the standard text-book redis-
6 Consider, for example, a mayoral election between a candidate supported by the party that controls the
national government and an independent candidate. In many cases, mayors that are aligned with ruling
parties receive larger transfers from national governments (see Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro 2008).
7 According to the American National Election Survey, which records voters’ own ideological position
on a scale from 1 (very liberal) to 7 (very conservative), the number of respondents who report one of the
extreme positions (1, 2, 6 and 7) has grown from 21 percent in 1976 to 31 percent in 2008.
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tribution problem in which two candidates are free to propose any balanced-budget
redistribution scheme—even ones that upset the income ordering of citizens—no equi-
libria exist: for each redistribution scheme, there is another one which is preferred by
a majority. In the framework of this problem, Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) make the
following seminal observation: if voters care not only about the redistribution scheme
but also about other characteristics of candidates and if candidates are sufficiently
uncertain about how each voter evaluates their other characteristics, then a conver-
gent equilibrium may exist. The equilibrium existence conditions that they provide
are very stringent and the equilibrium redistribution scheme is such that the less polit-
ically biased income group receives transfers from all other income groups. That is,
not only could it be the case that there is redistribution in favor of the rich—something
which is at odds with bare-eye empirical observations—but it could further be that the
total redistribution in favor of the rich, in a case in which rich are the less biased group,
exceeds the total redistribution in favor of the poor in a case in which the poor are
the less biased group. Thereafter no clear inference may be drawn from these results
regarding the relationship between voters’ preferences on non-economic issues and
total equilibrium redistribution. The second paper whose formal setup is very close to
ours is a recent one by Krasa and Polborn (2014a). In their paper, they consider that
candidates, who are differentiated in social ideology, strategically decide a flat tax rate
in order to provide a public good. Their analysis is of predominant importance for
our work as it was the first one that demonstrated that economic policy does not only
depend on the distribution of income but also on the distribution of social preferences.
Its aimwasmore to establish the existence of this effect between social preferences and
economic outcomes, rather than to investigate the degree to which this effect creates
the described representation gap.
There are a number of other papers which also explore the link between voter
diversity and redistribution. Roemer (1998), for example, by analyzing a model with
two policy-motivated candidates who strategically decide both a level of taxation and
a social policy points to the intuitive idea that when the social issue is significantly
more important for the voters than the economic issue, candidates policy platforms
will converge to the ideal policy of the median of the social issue dimension. To
obtain these results though, he introduces and applies a non-conventional equilibrium
concept since such two-dimensional models rarely admit a Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies. Moreover Austen-Smith andWallerstein (2006), Lizzeri and Persico (2001,
2004), Levy (2004), Fernández and Levy (2008) and Huber and Ting (2013) also
explore how diversity among the voters affects the size of government and the type of
redistribution. But in all these papers, preference diversity among voters is considered
to be of economic nature (some prefer general interest policies while others prefer
specialized transfers) and not in relation to some non-economic issue as in this paper
or as in Krasa and Polborn (2014a).
In what follows we first present the formal model and the results considering sym-
metric redistribution technologies. Then we provide a generalization of the model and
we show that our results are robust to introducing possibly asymmetric redistribution
technologies and efficiency costs of taxation. Finally, we comment on the implications
of our results on issues of applied interest.
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2 The model
We model electoral competition between two candidates, A and B, taking place in a
two-dimensional space. We name those two dimensions non-economic characteris-
tics and redistribution, respectively. Following the literature of electoral competition
between differentiated candidates (Krasa andPolborn 2010a, 2012, 2014a;Dziubin´ski
and Roy 2011), we assume that the two candidates have fixed non-economic character-
istics, while in the second dimension they strategically choose a redistribution scheme
to maximize expected vote shares. We, moreover, consider a unit mass of heteroge-
neous voters that differ both in terms of their non-economic characteristics and also
in terms of their incomes.
We formally denote the platform of a candidate J ∈ {A, B} by (sJ , tJ ) ∈ R×[0, 1]
where sJ ∈ R is the fixed non-economic characteristic of candidate J and tJ ∈ [0, 1]
is a flat tax rate strategically chosen by the vote sharemaximizing candidate J (without
loss of generalityweconsider that sA ≤ sB). That is, unlikeCoxandMcCubbins (1986)
where candidates could use practically any redistribution scheme, in our setup can-
didates are allowed to promise only standard balanced-budget redistribution schemes
which belong to the class defined by Meltzer and Richard (1981).
Each voter is characterized by her non-economic characteristic, x ∈ R, and her
income y ∈ {m, M}, with 0 ≤ m < M. We denote by q ∈ (0, 1) the mass of poor
voters (voters who have income m) and by (1−q) the mass of rich voters (voters who
have income M). The non-economic characteristics of the poor voters are distributed
on R according to an absolutely continuous distribution function Fp with a strictly
positive density denoted by f p, while the non-economic characteristics of the rich
voters are distributed on R according to an absolutely continuous distribution function
Fr with a strictly positive density denoted by fr .8 Each voter votes for the candidate
whose platform, once implemented, offers the highest utility. In case of indifference a
voter splits her vote. The distribution of income and the distributions of non-economic
characteristics for each of the two groups of voters is common information. The utility
of a voter with non-economic characteristic x ∈ R and income y ∈ {m, M} when the
elected candidate has non-economic characteristic s ∈ R and implements a flat tax
rate t ∈ [0, 1] is given by:
U(x,y)(s, t) = v(|x − s|) + w(y(1 − t) + T (t))
where T (t) is the average revenue raised:
T (t) = t[qm + (1 − q)M]
and in a Meltzer and Richard (1981) redistribution scheme it coincides with the flat
individual redistributive transfer.
Notice that preferences on flat individual redistributive transfers are always
monotonic (independently of the number of distinct income groups): an income group
8 This assumption is made only for simplicity. All our general results hold if the densities of these distrib-
utions are strictly positive in a non-degenerate open interval which contains sA+sB2 .
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with income smaller (larger) than the mean income prefers a higher (lower) tax rate
to a lower (higher) one. That is, in our case, the distribution of voters’ ideal tax rates
is always a Bernoulli one with support {0, 1} and parameter q.
We consider that v : [0,+∞) → R is twice differentiable, strictly decreasing,
strictly concave everywhere with v(0) = v′(0) = 0, limx→+∞ v′(x) = −∞ and
limx→+∞ v′′(x) − v′′(x − c) = ±∞ for a fixed c ∈ R.9 That is, a voter has symmet-
ric and single-peaked preferences on the non-economic dimension; the more similar
the elected candidate’s non-economic characteristic to hers, the better. As far as the
economic dimension is concerned, we assume that w : [0,+∞) → R is a twice
differentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave function with w(0) = 0.
We consider a voting game with three stages. All information is publicly available
and known ex ante to all agents. The solution concept we employ is Nash equilibrium.
The three stages of the game are as follows:
Stage 1: Candidates announce simultaneously their platforms (sA, tA) and (sB, tB)
which become common information.
Stage 2: Each voter votes for the candidate whose platform, once implemented,
offers the highest utility.
Stage 3: Each candidate J ∈ {A, B} receives her payoffs which coincide with her
vote share.
Given that the behavior of voters is trivial in such two-candidate voting games
(they vote for the platform they prefer), we focus on the two-player game between
the candidates. To do that we first need to investigate voters’ optimal behavior when
candidates announce platforms (sA, tA) and (sB, tB). For any fixed sA < sB our
assumptions regarding v(·) imply that there exists a single-valued, continuous and
twice-differentiable i p(tA, tB) : [0, 1]2 → R which denotes the indifferent poor voter
when candidates choose (tA, tB) ∈ [0, 1] and it is such that:
v
(∣∣i p (tA, tB) − sA
∣∣) + w (m (1 − tA) + T (tA))
= v (∣∣i p (tA, tB) − sB
∣∣) + w (m (1 − tB) + T (tB))
which can be written as:10
v
(∣∣i p (tA, tB) − sA
∣∣) − v (∣∣i p (tA, tB) − sB
∣∣)
= w (m (1 − tB) + T (tB)) − w (m (1 − tA) + T (tA)) .
9 This is a very mild assumption of only technical nature which simply states that changes in the degree of
concavity of v should not be unbounded.
10 Consider without loss of generality that sB = −sA = s and fix s > 0. Then the function k(x) =
v(|x + s|) − v(|x − s|) is differentiable and strictly decreasing for every x ∈ R. This is so because: (a)
despite |x | not being differentiable at zero, v(|x |) is differentiable at zero (limε→0− v′(|ε|)sgn(ε) = 0 and
limε→0+ v′(|ε|)sgn(ε) = 0) and (b) k′(x) = v′(|x + s|)sgn(x + s)− v′(|x − s|)sgn(x − s) < 0 for every
x ∈ R due to the fact that v : [0,+∞) → R is strictly decreasing and strictly concave, with v′(0) = 0. That
is, k is invertible and, hence, i p(tA, tB ) is uniquely defined by i p(tA, tB ) = k−1(w(m(1− tB )+ T (tB ))−
w(m(1− tA)+T (tA))) , which is straightforwardly differentiable for every tA and tB . The interested reader
is referred to Groseclose (2001) and Aragonès and Xefteris (2012) for further details.
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Obviously, when tA = tB monotonicity of v(·) implies that i p(tA, tB) = sA+sB2 .
When tA > tB we observe that i p(tA, tB) >
sA+sB
2 and when tA < tB we have that
i p(tA, tB) <
sA+sB
2 . Equivalently, there exists a single-valued, continuous and twice-
differentiable ir (tA, tB) : [0, 1]2 → R which denotes the indifferent rich voter when
candidates choose (tA, tB) ∈ [0, 1] and it is such that:
v (|ir (tA, tB) − sA|) + w (M (1 − tA) + T (tA))
= v (|ir (tA, tB) − sB |) + w (M (1 − tB) + T (tB))
which can be written as:
v (|ir (tA, tB) − sA|) − v (|ir (tA, tB) − sB |)
= w (M (1 − tB) + T (tB)) − w (M (1 − tA) + T (tA)) .
When tA = tB monotonicity of v(·) implies that ir (tA, tB) = sA+sB2 . When tA > tB
we have that ir (tA, tB) <
sA+sB
2 and when tA < tB we have that ir (tA, tB) >
sA+sB
2 .
That is, for fixed sA < sB and candidates choosing (tA, tB) ∈ [0, 1] we have that all
the poor voters with non-economic characteristics to the left of i p(tA, tB) vote for A
and all poor voters with non-economic characteristics to the right of i p(tA, tB) vote
for B. Equivalently, all the rich voters with non-economic characteristics to the left
of ir (tA, tB) vote for A and all rich voters with non-economic characteristics to the
right of ir (tA, tB) vote for B. Consequently, the payoff functions of the two candidates
when sA < sB are given by:
πA (tA, tB) = q × Fp
(
i p (tA, tB)
) + (1 − q) × Fr (ir (tA, tB))
and
πB (tA, tB) = q ×
[
1 − Fp
(
i p (tA, tB)
)] + (1 − q) × [1 − Fr (ir (tA, tB))]
When sA = sB the payoff functions of the two candidates are:
πA(tA, tB) = 1 − πB(tA, tB) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
q if tA > tB
1
2 if tA = tB
(1 − q) if tA < tB
3 Analysis
We start by providing two general formal results which offer a solid foundation to our
subsequent, more detailed, analysis.
Proposition 1 For every q ∈ (0, 1), every M > 0, every m ∈ [0, M), every admissible
Fp and Fr and every sA < sB the game admits an equilibrium in mixed strategies.11
11 All proofs can be found in the appendix.
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This trivially follows from the fact that when sA < sB we have that i p(tA, tB)
and ir (tA, tB) are continuous in every (tA, tB) ∈ [0, 1]2 and, hence, πA(tA, tB) and
πB(tA, tB) are continuous in every (tA, tB) ∈ [0, 1]2. Therefore the two conditions of
Glicksberg (1952) are satisfied (compactness of the strategy space and continuity of
the payoff function in own strategies) and an equilibrium in mixed strategies exists.
Next we provide the most general formal result of the paper.
Proposition 2 For every q ∈ (0, 1), every M > 0, every m ∈ [0, M) and for every
admissible Fp and Fr the game admits an equilibrium in pure strategies if candidates
are sufficiently differentiated, that is, if sB − sA is sufficiently large. This equilibrium
is unique, symmetric, that is, tA = tB = t∗, and it is such that: (a) t∗ = 1 when
f p(
sA+sB
2 ) ≥ fr ( sA+sB2 ), (b) t∗ < 1 when f p( sA+sB2 ) < fr ( sA+sB2 ) and (c) t
∗
q ≥ 0,
t∗
 f p(
sA+sB
2 )
≥ 0, t∗
 fr (
sA+sB
2 )
≤ 0 and t∗
(sB−sA) = 0 for (sB − sA) sufficiently small.
This proposition states that a unique equilibrium tax rate is guaranteed to exist
as long as candidates are sufficiently differentiated. No restrictions on voters’ utility
functions or on all other parameters of the model were necessary to obtain this result.
That is, unlike Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) whose equilibrium existence conditions
are very difficult to be satisfied and unlike Krasa and Polborn (2014a) who focus
only on local equilibria,12 our framework allows us to establish existence of a unique
Nash equilibrium under very mild assumptions. Moreover we were able to retrieve
important qualitative features of this unique equilibrium tax rate even in the general
case: the equilibrium tax rate is increasing in the size of the group of poor voters
(group-size effect), it becomes one when the densities of the swing voters of both
income groups are the same (income effect) and it is increasing in the ratio of the
density of poor swing voters over the density of rich swing voters (within-group
homogeneity effect).13 Finally, we show that the degree of candidate differentiation
in the non-economic issue, despite it being an important determinant of whether an
equilibrium exists or not, does not affect the equilibrium tax rate once an equilibrium
exists.
In the analysis that follows, we elaborate on these qualitative features of our equi-
librium: (a) by offering a fewmore general results and (b) by discussing in more detail
some representative parametrization of our general model that will allow us to assess
in an analytical way the relative prevalence of each one of those three forces.
3.1 Group-size effect dominance
As we saw above when candidates are sufficiently differentiated, a unique equilibrium
exists and it is such that t
∗
q ≥ 0. This means that the groups’ relative sizes reflect
12 An interior local equilibrium, (θ1, θ2), of a two-player game in the unit square (each player’s strategy
set is the segment [0, 1]) is a Nash equilibrium of the variant of this game in which the only admissible
strategy profiles are the ones contained in (θ1 − ε, θ1 + ε) × (θ2 − ε, θ2 + ε) for ε > 0 sufficiently small.
Hence such strategy profiles guarantee stability if players are allowed to make only tiny deviations away
from a posited strategy and not if players are allowed to move away to any other strategy.
13 Throughout this paper, the term “density of the poor (rich) swing voters” always refers to the density
function of the distribution, f p ( fr ), evaluated at the mid-point
sA+sB
2 .
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on the equilibrium tax rate. We will now argue that when candidates are similar, this
group-size effect is further amplified. In particular, we will show that it becomes
the predominant determinant of the equilibrium tax rate when candidates are not
differentiated at all.
Proposition 3 For every q ∈ (0, 1) − { 12 }, every M > 0, every m ∈ [0, M), every
admissible Fp and Fr and sA = sB the game admits a unique equilibrium which is
(tA, tB) = (0, 0) when q < 12 and (tA, tB) = (1, 1) when q > 12 . When q = 12 any
strategy profile is an equilibrium.
Naturally, in this case, as candidates are not differentiated in the non-economic
dimension the only relevant policy for all voters is redistribution. Then, the resulting
utility of income of a poor voter, given tax rate t ∈ (0, 1) is given by:
w (m(1 − t) + qmt + (1 − q)Mt) = w (m + (1 − q)(M − m)t) > w(m)
whereas, for a rich one it is:
w(M(1 − t) + qmt + (1 − q)Mt) = w(M − q(M − m)t) < w(M)
By monotonicity of w(·) it follows that a poor voter strictly prefers a flat tax rate
tˆ to another flat tax rate t˜ if and only if tˆ > t˜ . On the contrary, a rich voter strictly
prefers a flat tax rate tˆ to another flat tax rate t˜ if and only if tˆ < t˜ .14 These dynamics
trivially lead to the above result. Here the only relevant factors for the determination
of the equilibrium tax rate are the relative sizes of the two income groups: the group-
size effect is the dominant force. The intuition behind this result is straightforward.
Suppose that 49% of the population are poor and 51% are rich. If both candidates
pander to the rich, they each get one half of the votes. Proposing a higher tax rate
is attractive only to the poor, and a candidate who does so receives only 49% of the
votes. As a result, this is not an optimal deviation.
But, how does the importance of this effect vary as a function of the degree of can-
didates’ differentiation? As we have just seen, when candidates are not differentiated,
relative group size is the only thing that matters for the determination of equilibrium
tax rate. Moreover by Proposition 2 we know that when candidates are sufficiently
differentiated and a pure strategyNash equilibrium exists, it is true that the equilibrium
tax rate does not depend on the exact degree of candidate differentiation and that fac-
tors other than groups’ sizes affect equilibrium tax rate. Hence the importance of the
group-size effect is present but not predominant when candidates are sufficiently dif-
ferentiated and becomes predominant when candidates are not differentiated. Roughly
speaking, this implies that as candidates become less differentiated, the importance of
the group-size effect becomes greater.
14 This formulation of preferences, within each group, is exactly equivalent to Groseclose’s (2007) “one-
and-a-half dimensional” preferences where “alternatives are described by two characteristics: their position
in a spatial dimension, and their position in a good-bad [high-low tax rate] dimension, over which voters
[of the same group] have identical preferences.”
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3.2 Income effect dominance
Proposition 2 also pointed to another feature of the equilibrium tax rate when can-
didates are sufficiently differentiated; it tends to favor the poor voters. In particular,
when the distributions of the non-economic characteristics of the two income groups
coincide (that is when Fp = Fr )15 it is the case that t∗ = 1 independently of what is
the exact size of the group of poor voters. The reason behind this equilibrium feature
is that, ceteris paribus, poor voters—due to concavity of the component of the util-
ity function which relates to income—are relatively more willing than rich voters to
switch their votes in response to tiny increases in the level of promised redistribution
by one of the candidates. And, since the non-economic characteristics of these two
income groups in this case are identical, this income effect becomes dominant.
But how strong is this result? That is, when Fp = Fr , is there a δ > 0 such that
if sB − sA > δ the equilibrium tax rate is t∗ = 1 for any q ∈ (0, 1) (if this is the
case, then the income effect finding would prove to be dominant) or is it the case that
when q → 0 it must be that sB − sA → +∞ (if this is the case, then the income
effect finding would prove to be weak)? In other words, can we find a degree of
candidate differentiation that guarantees that when the non-economic characteristics
of both groups are identical, relative group size will not affect equilibrium tax rate and
candidates will always pander to the group of poor voters?
In what follows we attempt to provide a positive answer to this last question and,
hence, show that the income effect dominates all others when Fp = Fr and candidates
are sufficiently differentiated. To this end, we specifically assume that m = 0, M = 1
and that v(ξ) = −ξ2 and w(ξ) = √ξ .16 For our next result, we consider that Fp and
Fr are both uniform distributions on [0, 1] and that sA ≤ 12 ≤ sB = 1 − sA.17
Proposition 4 The strategy profile (tA, tB) = (1, 1) is the unique Nash equilibrium:
(a) for any sA ∈ [0, 12 ] when q > 12 and (b) for sA ∈ [0, g(q)] when q ≤ 12 ,
where g(q) = −1+2q2q + 12
√
1−3q+3q2−q3
q2
. For q ≤ 12 and sA ∈ (g(q), 12 ) there is no
equilibrium in pure strategies.
Notice that g(0) = 14 and g(1/2) = 12√2 . Hence when sA <
1
4 candidates pander
to the group of poor voters for any q ∈ (0, 1), that is, independently of the size of
that group. When there are many poor voters (that is, when q is relatively large),
the intuition behind the result is clear: candidates target the poor since they are more
responsive to redistributive transfers compared to the rich. But why do candidates
15 The qualitative implications of this subsection’s analysis do not limit to the case in which Fp = Fr but
directly extend to any case in which f p(
sA+sB
2 ) ≥ fr ( sA+sB2 ). In order to conduct, though, a head-to-head
comparison between the group-size effect and the income effect, it is preferable to neutralize all third forces
of the model which may influence equilibrium tax rate in one way or another.
16 These assumptions are only made for analytical tractability without any loss of generality. Krasa and
Polborn (2014a), for example, as well as many other papers also consider specific functional forms for v(·)
and w(·) that are identical or similar to ours.
17 Given that a uniform distribution on [0, 1] does not have a strictly positive density at every point in R
an independent proof is formally necessary here. Despite that, we see that none of the qualitative findings
of this case stands at any contrast to the general findings of Proposition 2.
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Fig. 2 Payoffs of candidate A, πA (tA, 1)—height—as a function of tA [0, 1]—length—and sA = 1 −
sB [0, 0.14]—width—when: (i) the income distribution is given by a uniform distribution on [0, 1] and (ii)
B is expected to play tB = 1
propose maximum redistribution even when the poor are very few (that is, even when
q is relatively small)? When q is very small: (a) the difference between the pre- and
post-redistribution income of a rich voter is very small, independently of the applied
tax rate, and (b) the difference between the pre- and the post-redistribution income of
a poor voter is very large (small) when the applied tax rate is large (small). As a result,
a candidate still has incentives to propose more redistribution than her opponent: by
doing so she effectively takes with her all the poor voters (whose utility varies a lot in
tax rate), while at the same time she loses very few rich voter—their utility is relatively
invariant in changes in the tax rate and, hence, they vote mainly on the basis of their
preferences on the non-economic dimension.
As we argued above, the quality of all the above results does not depend on our
specific assumptions regarding v(·) and w(·). What is, perhaps, more important to
stress here is that the income effect dominance result qualifies to a case in which there
are more than two income groups; even for a case in which there is a continuum of
income groups. That is, we can relax the assumption that the support of the income
distribution consists of only two points, m and M (the choice of m = 0 and M = 1 is
obviouslywithout any loss of generality), and assume instead a continuous distribution
of income. For instance, we can construct an example with a uniform distribution of
incomes on [0, 1] (as in Krasa and Polborn 2014a) considering that the distribution of
non-economic characteristics of voters of each income level is uniform. In this case,
one can validate (see Fig. 2) that when candidates are sufficiently differentiated, the
strategy profile (tA, tB) = (1, 1) is the unique Nash equilibrium of the game.
Moreover by Proposition 2 we know that the game exhibits the same qualitative
features for any Fr = Fp. Hence when distribution of non-economic characteristics
across income groups is identical and candidates are sufficiently differentiated, the
incomeeffect dominance result is really robust. Toget a sense of the relative importance
of the income effect, we present below computational results from the case in which
sB = −sA and Fr = Fp = N (0, 1).
As we see in Table 1, the sufficiently large degree of candidate differentiation,
which was found in Proposition 2 to be necessary for the existence of a pure strategy
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Table 1 Equilibria for
Fr = Fp = N (0, 1) sA (tA, tB ) = (1, 1) is a N.E.
−2 for any q ∈ (0, 1)
−1 for any q ∈ (0, 1)
−0.08 for q ∈ (0.24, 1)
−0.04 for q ∈ (0.48, 1)
equilibrium, need actually be very small. If the majority of voters is poor (q > 12 ) then
any degree of candidate differentiation above 0.08 is enough to guarantee equilibrium
existence.
3.3 Within-group homogeneity effect dominance
We now move to what we consider to be the most important determinant of the equi-
librium tax rate: the relationship between the densities of the swing voters of the two
groups. By maintaining the parametrization of voters’ preferences and income levels
that we introduced above and by assuming that Fr and Fp is any admissible pair of
distributions, we can state the result that follows.
Proposition 5 If the density of poor swing voters is larger than the density of rich
swing voters ( f p(
sA+sB
2 ) ≥ fr ( sA+sB2 )) then for any q ∈ (0, 1) and any sB − sA
sufficiently large we have that (tA, tB) = (1, 1) is the unique Nash equilibrium of the
game. If the density of the rich swing voters is larger than the density of the poor swing
voters ( fr (
sA+sB
2 ) > f p(
sA+sB
2 )) then for any q ∈ (0, 1) and any sB − sA sufficiently
large we have that the unique Nash equilibrium of the game is (tA, tB) = (t∗, t∗),
where t∗ = f p(
sA+sB
2 )
2
q f p(
sA+sB
2 )
2+(1−q) fr ( sA+sB2 )2
.
Given Proposition 2, this result is quite straightforward. It suggests that not only
the size of a group but, most importantly, the density of swing voters of a group can
affect the equilibrium outcome in the direction preferred by that group. We, moreover,
observe that this equilibrium tax rate does not depend on the degree of differentiation
of the two candidates in the non-economic dimension. As in the case when Fr and
Fp were identical (see Proposition 4), here, as well, by bringing candidates very close
to each other we can only end up without any pure strategy equilibrium rather than
smoothly affecting the taxation levels in a pure strategy equilibrium.18
Notice that the density of a distribution F which belongs to any general family,
at its mean [denoted by f ( sA+sB2 ) if we assume that the mean of F is at
sA+sB
2 ] is
usually negatively related to its variance. That is, the relationship between f p(
sA+sB
2 )
and fr (
sA+sB
2 ) can be viewed as a rough, but fair in many cases, approximation of
the relationship between the levels of within-group homogeneity of the two income
groups.
18 Note that this is also the case in the price subgames of the popular Hotelling (1929) first-location-then-
price game when the locations of the two firms are very close (see d’Aspremont et al. 1979).
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We further observe that, for fr (
sA+sB
2 ) > f p(
sA+sB
2 ), it is true that:
∂t∗
∂ fr
( sA+sB
2
) < 0,
∂t∗
∂ f p
( sA+sB
2
) > 0 and
∂t∗
∂q
> 0.
That is, the more divided the group of poor voters in terms of non-economic char-
acteristics, the smaller the level of the equilibrium tax rate.
Note that to obtain this result we need not assume anything about Fr and Fp—
such as they are symmetric about sA+sB2 or any other point for that matter—other than
being twice differentiable. Hence our model fully incorporates the case in which one
income group can lean toward a specific candidate in the non-economic dimension.
For instance, going back to the example presented in the introduction, it can be that
poor voters are leaning toward the darker candidate while rich voters are relatively
more pale or vice versa. That is, the two dimensions can be correlated.
Moreover by specifically assuming that sB = −sA = 1, Fp = N (0, z) and
Fr = N (0, 1) we can computationally show that this pure strategy Nash equilib-
rium exists for any standard deviation z > 0. Hence even if the degree of within-group
homogeneity of poor voters becomes very low compared to that of the rich voters (that
is, z takes large values), candidate differentiation does not need to be immensely large
for our equilibrium to exist.
Proposition 6 If Fp = N (0, z) and Fr = N (0, 1) for z > 0 and sB = −sA = 1 then
for any q ∈ (0, 1) we have that: (a)when the density of poor swing voters is larger than
the density of rich swing voters ( f p(0) ≥ fr (0) ⇐⇒ z ≤ 1), then (tA, tB) = (1, 1)
is the unique Nash equilibrium of the game and (b) when the density of rich swing
voters is larger than the density of poor swing voters ( fr (0) > f p(0) ⇐⇒ z > 1),
then (tA, tB) = (t∗, t∗) where t∗ = 1q+(1−q)z2 is the unique Nash equilibrium of the
game.
Observe that, for q ∈ (0, 1), t∗ is strictly decreasing in z. Therefore when candi-
dates are sufficiently differentiated in the non-economic dimension, the ratio of the
densities of the swing voters of the two income groups is more relevant in determining
equilibrium redistribution than the ratio of the sizes of these groups. In such cases,
the within-group homogeneity effect dominates, or in other words becomes stronger
than both the group-size and the income effect: candidates will always pander to the
relatively more homogenous group, irrespective of its size. That is, the larger z is from
1 (poor are relatively less homogenous) the lower t∗ will be and vice versa.
It should be stressed that the within-group homogeneity effect extends to the case in
which there aremore than two income groups. By following the proof of Proposition 2,
one notices that the equilibrium existence and uniqueness results hold independently
of how many income groups are assumed to exist. The complexity of equilibrium
characterization, though, increases in several orders of magnitude. Despite this, it
is still clear that homogeneous—in terms of non-economic characteristics—income
groups exhibit larger influence on the equilibrium tax rate than heterogeneous ones.
For example, if we have three income groups (rich, median, poor) such that everybody
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except the rich were in favor of more redistribution19 and if rich voters were more
homogeneous than each of the other two groups, then again the equilibrium tax rate
would reflect the preferences of the rich voters.
Finally,wewould like to note that certainlyweare not thefirstwhoargue that solid—
in terms of non-economic preferences—income groups are more powerful compared
to more heterogeneous ones. In particular, Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) consider a
probabilistic voting model and show that income groups which are not biased toward
any of the candidates should expect to receive transfers from income groups who lean
toward one of the candidates. The probabilistic model that they consider is a special
case of the differentiated candidates model, if one assumes that the only source of
differentiation is a fixed characteristic and preferences are additively separable.20
That is, their model employs a structure, as far as non-economic issues are concerned,
which does not distinguish between objective candidates’ differences in non-economic
issues and differences in voters’ evaluation of candidates’ platforms that are driven by
voters’ preferences on those issues. As a consequence: (a) their main characterization
result (Theorem 1), which describes a convergent equilibrium, and the discussion that
follows is silent about the interaction between the within-group homogeneity effect
and the group-size effect and (b) their main equilibrium existence result (Theorem 2)
describes a technical condition that is very hard to be satisfied—if, for example, the
involved distributions are normal ones, then the described condition is not satisfied by
any utility function. In addition, we would like to stress that even when the described
condition is satisfied, it remains a technical condition: it does not provide an intuitive
description of the real-world cases in which one should expect stable outcomes in
electoral competition regarding redistribution. On the other hand, in the differentiated
candidates’model one can isolate objective candidate differences fromdifferences that
depend only on voters’ preferences, and, as we saw in this paper so far, this allows us
to describe intuitive conditions for equilibrium existence. Perhaps more importantly,
it also allows us to study the interplay between the three effects on equilibrium tax
rates. Moreover as we will see in the next section, the differentiated candidates’ model
allows us to extend both the existence and the characterization results to frameworks
in which different candidates have different redistribution technologies and, hence,
propose in equilibrium different tax rates—this is never the case in most probabilistic
voting models, including Lindbeck and Weibull (1987).
4 Generalization
In this section, we explore whether our results are robust in a number of dimensions.
Primarily, we wish to investigate whether the analysis that we have conducted is rel-
evant in settings that are more general than the one considered above. Sometimes,
19 This occurs when the median income is smaller than the average one (which is true in real-world income
distributions).
20 If, for example, v(ξ) = −ξ2 and sB = −sA = s > 0, then U(x,y)(sB , tB ) − U(x,y)(sA, tA) =
4sx + w(y(1 − tB ) + T (tB )) − w(y(1 − tA) + T (tA)). That is, for a fixed s, we can interpret 4sx as a
voter’s bias for candidate B (a negative value implies a bias for A) and we can define the distribution of the
biases of the poor (rich) by F˜p,s (x) = Fp( x4s ) (F˜r,s (x) = Fr ( x4s )).
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candidates are asymmetric not only in a fixed characteristic but also in their redistrib-
ution technology (one is referred to Krasa and Polborn 2014a for a discussion of the
relevance and an analysis of such a model). It could be, for example, that candidate
A’s redistribution technology favors the rich while candidate B is known to be biased
toward the poor (class asymmetries). Or, it could be the case that the election is held
for a local office (e.g., a mayor or regional governor) and that candidate A is supported
by the party that controls the national government. That is, candidate A is aligned with
the ruling party while candidate B is either independent or supported by an opposition
party. In many countries, it is observed that local officials that are supported by ruling
parties receive more funds from central government compared to local officials that
are not aligned with ruling parties (alignment asymmetries).21 Of course, there can
be many interesting ways to model asymmetries between candidates’ redistribution
technologies. Since our aim is to be as general as possible, we will not attempt to
study particular examples of asymmetries but to show that our equilibrium existence
result holds for a general class of asymmetric technologies and, more importantly,
that its main qualitative features remain intact as well. While doing that, though, we
will be referring to the two examples that we discussed above (class and alignment
asymmetries) in order for the analysis to be as less abstract as possible.
Secondarily, we are interested in studying the effect of enriching our main model
(symmetric redistribution technologies) with more realistic elements. In specific, we
wish to explore whether introducing efficiency costs of taxation upsets equilibrium
existence and the direction of our results. Redistribution is hardly ever a zero-cost
procedure as we model it here. Transferring wealth from one individual to another
usually involves a welfare loss that needs to be taken into account. Hence for the
preceding analysis to have empirical relevance one should make sure that its results
qualify the introduction of such costs.
4.1 Asymmetric technologies
We consider here the same model as in the main part of our paper, with the only
difference that the effect of a redistribution scheme on a voters’ utility may be both
class- and candidate-specific. Namely, we consider that the utility of a voter with non-
economic characteristic x ∈ R and income y ∈ {m, M} when the elected candidate is
J ∈ {A, B} is given by:
U(x,y)(s, t) = v(|x − sJ |) + wJ,y(tJ ).
All the other assumptions remain the same as before (e.g., candidatesmaximize vote
share, voters vote for the candidate they like best) and are not repeated for economy
of space. Notice that we may have up to four distinct wJ,y’s. In our main model, the
quadruplet W = {wA,m, wA,M , wB,m, wB,M } was such that wA,y(t) = wB,y(t) =
w(y(1− t)+ T (t)), for each y ∈ {m, M}. Here no element of W needs to be identical
21 See, for example, Solé-Ollé andSorribas-Navarro (2008) for empirical evidence frommunicipal elections
in Spain.
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to an other element of W . In line with our assumptions regarding the function w,
we only assume that wJ,y : [0, 1] → R is a twice differentiable, strictly increasing
(strictly decreasing) and strictly concave function, for every J ∈ {A, B} and y = m
(y = M).22
Given that the general setting that we consider here complicates the analysis in
several orders ofmagnitude—mainly as far as the description of the qualitative features
of an equilibrium are concerned— we fix v(ξ) = −ξ2.23 Hence for any sA < sB and
(tA, tB) ∈ [0, 1], the indifferent poor voter is defined by:
i˚ p(tA, tB) = s
2
B − s2A + wA,m(tA) − wB,m(tB)
2(sB − sA)
and the indifferent rich voter is defined by:
i˚r (tA, tB) = s
2
B − s2A + wA,M (tA) − wB,M (tB)
2(sB − sA) .
That is, the payoff functions of the two differentiated candidates (sA < sB) are
given by:
πA(tA, tB) = q × Fp
(
i˚ p (tA, tB)
)
+ (1 − q) × Fr
(
i˚r (tA, tB)
)
and
πB(tA, tB) = q ×
[
1 − Fp
(
i˚ p (tA, tB)
)]
+ (1 − q) ×
[
1 − Fr
(
i˚r (tA, tB)
)]
.
This general formulation allows us to consider at the same time both preferences
that satisfy Uniform Candidate Ranking (UCR) and non-UCR ones. In the present
setup, a voter’s preferences satisfy UCR when, for example, wA,y(t) = wB,y(t) for
each y ∈ {m, M}. UCR24 essentially requires that if a voter prefers A to B when both
candidates propose t , then she should also prefer A to B when both candidates propose
t ′, for any (t, t ′) ∈ [0, 1]2. It is straightforward that the voters’ preferences in the main
model satisfy UCR and that the voters’ preferences in the two examples sketched
22 The assumption that the poor (rich) voters are better (worse) off the higher the tax rate is not necessary
to prove existence of an equilibrium, but it is needed in order for us to describe its qualitative features. We
also require that there exists η1 ∈ R and η2 ∈ R such that η1 < wJ,y(t) < η2 and η1 < w′J,y(t) < η2 for
every J ∈ {A, B}, every y ∈ {m, M} and every t ∈ [0, 1].
23 If one assumes that v(·) preserves its general form, then one can easily modify all arguments of Step 1
and of Step 2 of the proof of Proposition 2, and demonstrate that a unique equilibrium of this generalized
game exists when candidates are sufficiently differentiated. In reality, everything remains the same except
for the fact that now, for a given strategy profile, the indifferent poor voter and the indifferent rich voter may
be at the same side of sA+sB2 . Even in such cases, though, the argument that both these voters approach
sA+sB
2 when sB − sA increases remains valid and, hence, the rest of the existence proof goes through.
24 The interested reader is referred to Krasa and Polborn (2012) for a thorough discussion of this property.
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above (class and alignment asymmetries) violate UCR. To make the latter clear, we
formally define the described examples of asymmetric redistribution technologies by:
WClass = {w (m(1 − t) + ψA,m T (t)
)
, w
(
M(1 − t) + ψA,M T (t)
)
, w (m(1 − t)
+ψB,m T (t)
)
, w
(
M(1 − t) + ψB,M T (t)
)}
and
WAlignment = {w(m(1 − t) + T (t) + χ),w(M(1 − t) + T (t)
+χ),w(m(1 − t) + T (t)), w(M(1 − t) + T (t))}
where mqm+(1−q)M < ψA,m < 1 < ψA,M <
M
qm+(1−q)M (ψB,m > 1 > ψB,M > 0)
and qψJ,m + (1 − q)ψJ,M = 1 for both J ∈ {A, B}; and χ > 0. Hence in the
first (second) case, a rich voter with a non-economic characteristic equal to sA+sB2 +
ε (
s2B−s2A+w(M+χ)−w(M)
2(sB−sA) + ε), for ε > 0 sufficiently small, prefers candidate B to
candidate A when they both propose tA = tB = 0, but she prefers candidate A to
candidate B when both candidates propose tA = tB = 1 –both scenarios are non-
UCR.25
We proceed now to the equilibrium existence result.
Proposition 7 For every q ∈ (0, 1), every M > 0, every m ∈ [0, M) and for every
admissible Fp, Fr and W the game admits an equilibrium in pure strategies, (t∗A, t∗B),
if candidates are sufficiently differentiated, that is, if sB − sA is sufficiently large. This
equilibrium is unique and, when interior, it is such that
w′A,m (t∗A)
w′A,M (t∗A)
= w
′
B,m (t
∗
B )
w′B,M (t∗B )
.
That is, when redistribution technology is both class- and candidate-specific, the
unique equilibrium of the game need not be symmetric. In fact, the presented con-
dition, which must hold in an interior equilibrium, indicates that when candidates’
redistribution technologies are asymmetric we should generically have t∗A = t∗B .
This complicates the analysis of the qualitative features of the equilibrium for a
generic W : when candidates use symmetric strategies, t∗A = t∗B = t∗, then we have
i˚ p(t∗A, t∗B) = i˚r (t∗A, t∗B) = sA+sB2 ; and this makes the comparative statics analysis of
t∗ with respect to q (group-size effect) and to fr ( sA+sB2 )/ f p(
sA+sB
2 ) (within-group
homogeneity effect) straightforward.26 When t∗A = t∗B , though, it is not as straight-
forward to study how t∗A and t∗B respond to changes in q and fr (
sA+sB
2 )/ f p(
sA+sB
2 ).
Despite this apparent complication, we can prove that both the group-size effect and
the within-group homogeneity effect are present in this general model, conditional on
the two candidates being sufficiently differentiated.
25 For the first case this is obviously true. To see why this holds for the second case too notice that w is
strictly concave and, hence, w(M + χ) − w(M) < w(qm + (1 − q)M + χ) − w(qm + (1 − q)M) for
every q ∈ (0, 1).
26 Notice that the income effect cannot be studied in this general framework as it is very particular to the
specific nature of the redistribution technologies. That is, here we also allow for rich voters’ utilities reacting
more to changes in redistribution schemes compared to poor voters’ utilities.
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Fig. 3 Interior equilibrium strategies of candidate A (blue) and candidate B (red) for the class-asymmetries
case (left) and the alignment-asymmetries case (right) as a function of fr
(
sB+sA
2
)
/ f p
(
sB+sA
2
)
, consid-
ering sB = −sA = s → +∞, w (x) =
√
x, q = 0.6, m = 0, M = 1, ψA,M = ψB,m = 1.1 and χ = 0.1
(color figure online)
Proposition 8 Consider society one, (Fp, Fr , q) and society two, (Fˆp , Fˆr , qˆ) and
fix sA, sB, M > 0, m ∈ [0, M), and W (all common for both societies) such that
an interior equilibrium, (t∗A, t∗B), exists for society one and an interior equilibrium,
(tˆ∗A, tˆ∗B), exists for society two. The following statements hold: (a) if candidates are suf-
ficiently differentiated and q = qˆ , then t∗J < tˆ∗J if and only if fr ( sA+sB2 )/ f p( sA+sB2 ) >
fˆr (
sA+sB
2 )/ fˆ p(
sA+sB
2 ), for each J ∈ {A, B}; (b) if candidates are sufficiently differ-
entiated and fr (
sA+sB
2 )/ f p(
sA+sB
2 ) = fˆr ( sA+sB2 )/ fˆ p( sA+sB2 ), then t∗J < tˆ∗J if and only
if q < qˆ , for each J ∈ {A, B}.
This proposition extends the qualitative findings of our analysis to more general
settings. If candidates are sufficiently differentiated in their non-economic character-
istics, then they may be proposing the same redistribution scheme if their technologies
are symmetric and different redistribution schemes if their technologies are asymmet-
ric, but in all cases the proposed tax rates should react positively to an increase in q
and negatively to an increase in fr (
sA+sB
2 )/ f p(
sA+sB
2 ). In other words, both the group-
size effect and the within-group homogeneity effect on redistribution are proven to be
robust to candidates having asymmetric redistribution technologies.
In Fig. 3, we present the equilibria of the class-asymmetries and the alignment-
asymmetries examples and, as expected, they are indeed diverging. In the first case,
the candidate that is expected to favor the rich proposes greater redistribution com-
pared to the candidate that is expected to favor the poor, and in the second case the
aligned candidate proposes a smaller tax rate compared to the nonaligned candidate.
In accordance with the last proposition, all candidates’ proposed tax rates are decreas-
ing in the ratio of the density of rich swing voters over the density of poor swing
voters.
123
Divide and Rule
4.2 Efficiency costs of taxation
It is true that redistribution is not an absolutely zero-cost procedure. It can involve
efficiency costs; economic agents probably face less incentives to generate income
when taxation is high compared to when taxation is low. In this part of the paper, we
briefly address this issue by incorporating in the original version of our model the
following assumption: we now consider that the pre-redistribution income of all indi-
viduals depends on the applied tax rate. Formally, we assume that the pre-redistribution
income of an individual is y(1− ct) where, as before, y ∈ {m, M} and t ∈ [0, 1] and,
moreover, now c ∈ [0, 1] denotes the so-called efficiency costs. When c is large these
costs are large and suggest that an increase in the tax rate is a strong counter incentive
for income generation while when c is small these counter incentives are weak. The
original version of our model obviously corresponds to the case of c = 0.
Without entering into unnecessary formalities and focusing on the most frequent
parametrization of our main model,27 we will now argue that introducing efficiency
costs in our analysis unambiguously reinforces our main results: we find that the
equilibrium tax rate is decreasing in c. That is, not only it can be the case, as before,
that poor voters constitute a majority and the tax rate is very low (representation gap)
but now, with the efficiency costs of taxation, the equilibrium tax rate is even lower.
This is quite intuitive as introduction of these costs makes poor voters be less in favor
of redistribution. Even in the case in which m = 0 and, hence, these costs do not affect
the pre-redistribution income of poor voters, poor voters realize that if a very high tax
rate is implemented rich voters will generate less income. Moreover rich voters are
now hurt from taxes in two ways and, hence, their reaction to an increasing tax rate
is stronger than before. These forces are clear and in the same direction thus pushing
redistribution toward lower levels.
Using a same line of arguments as the one in the main model, one can show that
when candidates are sufficiently differentiated there exists a unique equilibrium tax
rate, t∗∗, and it is such that
t∗∗ = 1 if c ≤ q f p
( sA+sB
2
) − q fr
( sA+sB
2
)
fr
( sA+sB
2
) + 2q [ f p
( sA+sB
2
) − fr
( sA+sB
2
)] and
f p
(
sA + sB
2
)
≥ fr
(
sA + sB
2
)
and
t∗∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that q(−1 + 2ct
∗∗) f p
( sA+sB
2
)
√
(−1 + q)t∗∗(−1 + ct∗∗) +
(c + q − 2cqt∗∗) fr
( sA+sB
2
)
√
(−1 + ct∗∗)(−1 + qt∗∗)
= 0 otherwise.
In Fig. 4, we depict these equilibrium tax rates as a function of the efficiency
costs of taxation, c ∈ [0, 1] for, q = 0.8, f p( sA+sB2 ) = 1 and fr ( sA+sB2 ) ∈
27 Namely, m = 0, M = 1, v(ξ) = −ξ2 and w(ξ) = √ξ .
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Fig. 4 Interior equilibrium tax rates as a function of c ∈ [0, 1] when q = 0.8 and
fr
(
sB+sA
2
)
/ f p
(
sB+sA
2
)
= r , for various values of r
{0.5, 0.75, 1, 1.25, 1.5} and in Fig. 5 we depict them as a function of the size of
the group of poor voters q ∈ [0, 1] for f p( sA+sB2 ) = 1, fr ( sA+sB2 ) = 0.75 and
c ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.6}.
As we can see in these two figures, when taxation involves efficiency costs ceteris
paribus the rich are taxed even less. In a sense, we find that efficiency costs of taxation
are a fourth distinct determinant of equilibrium tax rate which does not upset the
existence and direction of the other three effects.
5 Discussion
The main point that this paper makes is to relate equilibrium levels of redistribution
and taxation with candidate differentiation and voter homogeneity on non-economic
matters (e.g., culture, identity, religion etc.). Our results show that when candi-
dates are sufficiently differentiated in non-economic dimensions, then it is possible
for a relatively less divided and more homogenous—in terms of non-economic
characteristics—group to have it its way, irrespective of its size, thus driving equi-
librium taxes and redistribution in the direction favored by it. That is, candidate
differentiation is a sine qua non condition for observing such an anti-majoritarian
outcome. The characterization of this interplay between voter homogeneity on non-
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Fig. 5 Interior equilibrium tax
rates as a function of q ∈ [0, 1]
when
fr
(
sB+sA
2
)
/ f p
(
sB+sA
2
)
=
0.75, for various values of c
Fig. 6 Presence and the
direction of the representation
gap when candidates are
differentiated (sB = −sA = 1),
as a function of the size of poor
voters q ∈ (0, 1)—width—and
relative within-rich homogeneity
z ∈ (0, 10]—height
economic matters, candidate differentiation and redistribution is the first element that
our analysis adds.
In addition, by returning to the parametrization of the model used for the statement
of Proposition 6, we can study how the direction of this representation gap varies with
the degree of relative within-group homogeneity (Fig. 6). While, starting from z ≤ 1,
candidate differentiation seems to initially favor the poor, the situation can be quickly
reversed in favor of the rich voters if polarization spills over from candidates to poor
voters: equilibrium tax rate becomes very small. Hence our findings can help under-
standing the current patterns of inequality and redistribution in theUSAwhere a strong
relationship between non-economic polarization and inequality has been documented
(McCarty et al. 2006).
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Whilewe defer for futurework amore detailed discussion of the policy implications
of our model, in the remaining part of this paper we briefly touch upon some of them.
First, our results suggest that increasing inequality need not be detrimental for growth.
That is, unlike previous studies (e.g., Alesina and Rodrik 1994; Persson and Tabellini
1994; Banerjee and Duflo 2003; Barro and Redlick 2011) that highlighted the negative
effects of inequality on growth –operating via increased taxation—our work suggests
that this need not be the case: the group-size effect is not always dominant and, hence,
more inequality does not lead always to more taxation and redistribution. Moreover
since voter polarization over non-economic matters and candidate differentiation have
significant spillover effects on economic issues, our work suggests that mechanisms
which can unbundle those issues—either via fiscal policy decentralization (e.g., intro-
ducing referenda on spending and taxes) or by introducing constitutional constraints
(e.g., upper and lower bounds on tax rates or independent tax authorities)—could
mitigate those effects. Thus our work extends in another direction previous findings
(Lockwood 2002) on the inefficiency of fiscal policy centralization.
Furthermore, if one interprets the non-economic dimension in terms of racial or
ethnic identity, then our main result—candidates propose relatively less redistribution
when the groupof high-incomevoters is ethnically or raciallymore homogenous—also
can be applied to examine the nature of redistribution in environments where ethnic
tensions are present. In fact, our model supplements existing empirical literature on
the relationship between ethnic homogeneity and preferences for redistribution (e.g.,
Alesina et al. 2001; Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Dahlberg et al. 2012) in the following
two ways. Firstly, it can provide a theoretical explanation to recent empirical findings
(e.g., Alesina et al. 1999, 2001; Alesina and Glaeser 2004) linking less (ethnically or
racially) homogenous societieswith lower levels of redistribution andhigher inequality
than more homogenous ones: given that the group of poor voters is usually ethnically
more diverse and divided, (ethnically) differentiated candidates have stronger incen-
tives to pander to the economic interests of the relatively more homogenous rich elite.
Secondly, it points to a new direction that needs to be explored further: it is relative
within-group ethnic homogeneity that might be responsible for those patterns. Hence
our work provides a framework to link economic inequality (and aversion to redistri-
bution) with the salience of issues of race, ethnicity and other forms of identity (e.g.,
religion and culture).
A natural way to extend our work further would be to examine how issue salience
arises endogenously. In line with Esteban and Ray (2008), our work can provide an
additional insight on the incentives that relatively more homogenous rich elites have
to support candidates or parties that campaign along the lines of ethnic, religious or
racial identity in many ethnically divided and polarized societies in order to increase
the salience of ethnic cleavages and to shift the axis of political competition from
class (redistribution) to identity. Assuming that parties or elites have preferences over
redistribution and are able to choose the social issue over which they campaign, what
would their choice be? Should the social issue be correlated or completely orthogonal
to the economic one?Our findings suggest that the answer to this question is not always
straightforward. What seems to matter the most is how divided are (in relative terms)
the different income groups over any particular issue. In general, while answering
those questions will help us shed some more light in the relationship between ethnic
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(or cultural) heterogeneity and inequality, their analysis goes beyond the scope of this
present study. Thus we defer them for future empirical and theoretical research.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
6 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 Existence of an equilibrium in mixed strategies for any admis-
sible parameters is guaranteed since the players’ payoff functions satisfy Glicksberg’s
(1952) conditions (continuous and bounded payoff functions, compact strategy sets).
unionsq
Proof of Proposition 2. Step 1 (Existence of a pure strategy equilibrium) Given the
continuity of πA(tA, tB) and πB(tA, tB) in every (tA, tB) ∈ [0, 1]2 it follows that if we
could find conditions which would guarantee that πA(tA, tB) is strictly quasiconcave
in tA for every tB ∈ [0, 1] (equivalently, that πB(tA, tB) is strictly quasiconcave in tB
for every tA ∈ [0, 1]), wewould establish existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies
(see Debreu 1952). To this end, we will characterize conditions which guarantee that
πA(tA, tB) is strictly concave in tA for every tB ∈ [0, 1] and hence that it is strictly
quasiconcave in tA for every tB ∈ [0, 1]. An analysis of the concavity of πB(tA, tB)
is equivalent and hence omitted.
Notice that when sA < sB we have
πA(tA, tB) = q × Fp(i p(tA, tB)) + (1 − q) × Fr (ir (tA, tB))
and hence that
∂2πA(tA, tB)
∂t2A
= q ×
[
∂2Fp(i p(tA, tB))
∂i p(tA, tB)2
(
∂i p(tA, tB)
∂tA
)2
+∂ Fp(i p(tA, tB))
∂i p(tA, tB)
∂2i p(tA, tB)
∂t2A
]
+(1 − q) ×
[
∂2Fr (ir (tA, tB))
∂ir (tA, tB)2
(
∂ir (tA, tB)
∂tA
)2
+∂ Fr (ir (tA, tB))
∂ir (tA, tB)
∂2ir (tA, tB)
∂t2A
]
.
We will argue that when sB − sA is sufficiently large, the expression ∂
2Fp(i p(tA,tB ))
∂i p(tA,tB )2
(
∂i p(tA,tB )
∂tA
)2 + ∂ Fp(i p(tA,tB ))
∂i p(tA,tB )
∂2i p(tA,tB )
∂t2A
is strictly negative for any (tA, tB) ∈ [0, 1]2.
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Implicit differentiation of
v(|i p(tA, tB) − sA|) + w(m(1 − tA) + T (tA))
= v(|i p(tA, tB) − sB |) + w(m(1 − tB) + T (tB))
with respect to tA yields
∂i p(tA, tB)
∂tA
= (m − M)(−1 + q) × w
′(m + (m − M)(−1 + q)tA)
−sgn(i p(tA, tB) − sA) × v′(|i p(tA, tB) − sA|) + sgn(i p(tA, tB) − sB) × v′(|i p(tA, tB) − sB |)
which is always positive because the numerator is positive and: (a) if tA > tB we have
that i p(tA, tB) >
sA+sB
2 > sA, implying sgn(i p(tA, tB) − sA) = 1 and |i p(tA, tB) −
sA| > |i p(tA, tB) − sB | and, hence, by strict concavity of v(·) it follows that the
denominator is positive independently of the value of sgn(i p(tA, tB) − sB), (b) if
tA = tB we have that i p(tA, tB) = sA+sB2 , implying sgn(i p(tA, tB) − sA) = 1,
sgn(i p(tA, tB) − sB) = −1 and |i p(tA, tB) − sA| = |i p(tA, tB) − sB | and, hence,
the denominator is positive and (c) if tA < tB we have that i p(tA, tB) <
sA+sB
2 <
sB , implying sgn(i p(tA, tB) − sB) = −1 and |i p(tA, tB) − sA| < |i p(tA, tB) − sB |
and, hence, by strict concavity of v(·) it follows that the denominator is positive
independently of the value of sgn(i p(tA, tB) − sA).
Hence for every (tA, tB) ∈ [0, 1]2 it is true that ∂i p(tA,tB )∂tA > 0. In a similar manner,
one can show that for every (tA, tB) ∈ [0, 1]2 it is true that ∂i p(tA,tB )∂tB < 0. That is, it
is true that i p(tA, tB) takes its maximal value at (1, 0) and its minimal value at (0, 1).
We write these maximal and minimal values as a function of the pair (sA, sB); that
is we consider that imaxp (sA, sB) = i p(1, 0) and iminp (sA, sB) = i p(0, 1). Obviously,
imaxp (sA, sB) >
sA+sB
2 > i
min
p (sA, sB).
Given that w(·) is continuous, strictly increasing and concave it follows that there
exists θ > 0 such that if sB − sA > θ , then it is the case that i p(tA, tB) ∈ (sA, sB) for
every (tA, tB) ∈ [0, 1]2. One can actually show that θ = v−1(−w(qm + (1−q)M)+
w(m)) by considering that candidate A chooses tA = 0, that candidate B chooses
tB = 1 and that sA and sB are such that i p(tA, tB) = sA. Hence assuming that: (a)
sB −sA is sufficiently large and (b) without loss of generality that sB = −sA = s > 0,
we implicitly differentiate
v
(
imaxp (−s, s) + s
)
+ w(m(1 − 1) + T (1))
= v
(
s − imaxp (−s, s)
)
+ w(m(1 − 0) + T (0))
with respect to s and we get
∂imaxp (−s, s)
∂s
=
v′
(
s − imaxp (−s, s)
)
− v′
(
s + imaxp (−s, s)
)
v′
(
s − imaxp (−s, s)
)
+ v′
(
s + imaxp (−s, s)
) < 0.
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In a similar manner, we can show that
∂iminp (−s,s)
∂s > 0.
These two derivatives help us see that by moving simultaneously sA and sB away
from a fixed point, the segment from which i p(tA, tB) takes its values shrinks about
this fixed point.
Since, when sB − sA is sufficiently large, it is the case that i p(tA, tB) ∈ (sA, sB)
we have
∂i p(tA, tB)
∂tA
= (m − M)(−1 + q) × w
′(m + (m − M)(−1 + q)tA)
−v′(i p(tA, tB) − sA) − v′(sB − i p(tA, tB))
and by further differentiating with respect to tA we get
∂2i p(tA, tB )
∂t2A
=
−(m − M)2(−1 + q)2w′′(m + (m − M)(−1 + q)tA) +
(
v′′(sB − i p(tA, tB )) − v′′(−sA + i p(tA, tB ))
) ( ∂i p (tA ,tB )
∂tA
)2
v′(sB − i p(tA, tB )) + v′(−sA + i p(tA, tB )) .
Therefore
∂2 Fp(i p(tA, tB ))
∂i p(tA, tB )2
(
∂i p(tA, tB )
∂tA
)2
+ ∂ Fp(i p(tA, tB ))
∂i p(tA, tB )
∂2i p(tA, tB )
∂t2A
= ∂
2 Fp(i p(tA, tB ))
∂i p(tA, tB )2
(
(m − M)(−1 + q) × w′(m + (m − M)(−1 + q)tA)
−v′(i p(tA, tB ) − sA) − v′(sB − i p(tA, tB ))
)2
+ ∂ Fp(i p(tA, tB ))
∂i p(tA, tB )
−(m − M)2(−1 + q)2w′′(m + (m − M)(−1 + q)tA) +
(
v′′(sB − i p(tA, tB )) − v′′(−sA + i p(tA, tB ))
) ( ∂i p (tA ,tB )
∂tA
)2
v′(sB − i p(tA, tB )) + v′(−sA + i p(tA, tB ))
= 1
v′(sB − i p(tA, tB )) + v′(−sA + i p(tA, tB ))
×
[
∂2 Fp(i p(tA, tB ))
∂i p(tA, tB )2
[(m − M)(−1 + q) × w′(m + (m − M)(−1 + q)tA)]2
v′(i p(tA, tB ) − sA) + v′(sB − i p(tA, tB ))
+ ∂ Fp(i p(tA, tB ))
∂i p(tA, tB )
[−(m − M)2(−1 + q)2w′′(m + (m − M)(−1 + q)tA)
+ (v′′(sB − i p(tA, tB )) − v′′(−sA + i p(tA, tB ))
)
(
∂i p(tA, tB )
∂tA
)2]]
.
We first notice that 1
v′(sB−i p(tA,tB ))+v′(−sA+i p(tA,tB )) < 0 for every (tA, tB) ∈ [0, 1]2
when sB − sA sufficiently large. So the whole expression above is strictly negative if
and only if the expression
[
∂2Fp(i p(tA, tB))
∂i p(tA, tB)2
[(m − M)(−1 + q) × w′(m + (m − M)(−1 + q)tA)]2
v′(i p(tA, tB) − sA) + v′(sB − i p(tA, tB))
+∂ Fp(i p(tA, tB))
∂i p(tA, tB)
[
−(m − M)2(−1 + q)2w′′(m + (m − M)(−1 + q)tA)
+ (v′′(sB − i p(tA, tB)) − v′′(−sA + i p(tA, tB))
) (∂i p(tA, tB)
∂tA
)2]]
is strictly positive.
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Considering that sA = sA+sB2 − c and sA = sA+sB2 + c we further observe that
lim
c→+∞
[(m − M)(−1 + q) × w′(m + (m − M)(−1 + q)tA)]2
v′(i p(tA, tB) − sA) + v′(sB − i p(tA, tB)) = 0,
because as we demonstrated when sB −sA increases, i p(tA, tB) remains close to sA+sB2
for every (tA, tB) ∈ [0, 1]2 and hence both v′(i p(tA, tB)− sA) and v′(sB − i p(tA, tB))
converge to minus infinity,
lim
c→+∞
∂i p(tA, tB)
∂tA
= lim
c→+∞
(m − M)(−1 + q) × w′(m + (m − M)(−1 + q)tA)
−v′(i p(tA, tB) − sA) − v′(sB − i p(tA, tB)) = 0,
for the same reason, and therefore when c → +∞ the expression under study con-
verges to
∂ Fp(i p(tA, tB))
∂i p(tA, tB)
[
−(m − M)2(−1 + q)2w′′(m + (m − M)(−1 + q)tA)
]
> 0
which is true for every admissible parameter values.
That is, when sB −sA is sufficiently large, ∂
2Fp(i p(tA,tB ))
∂i p(tA,tB )2
(
∂i p(tA,tB )
∂tA
)2+ ∂ Fp(i p(tA,tB ))
∂i p(tA,tB )
∂2i p(tA,tB )
∂t2A
< 0 for every (tA, tB) ∈ [0, 1]2. Similar arguments guarantee that
that when sB − sA is sufficiently large, the expression ∂2Fr (ir (tA,tB ))∂ir (tA,tB )2 (
∂ir (tA,tB )
∂tA
)2 +
∂ Fr (ir (tA,tB ))
∂ir (tA,tB )
∂2ir (tA,tB )
∂t2A
< 0 for every (tA, tB) ∈ [0, 1]2 too. Hence when sB −sA is suf-
ficiently large πA(tA, tB) is strictly concave in tA for every tB ∈ [0, 1] (equivalently,
πB(tA, tB) is strictly concave in tB for every tA ∈ [0, 1]) and an equilibrium in pure
strategies is guaranteed to exist.
Step 2 (Uniqueness of the equilibrium) Notice that the game is a constant-sum
game and consider that (tA, tB) and (tˆA, tˆB) are both equilibria of the game. These
two strategy profiles to be distinct it should either be the case that tA = tˆA or that
tB = tˆB - or both. Assume without loss of generality that tA = tˆA. Since the game
is constant-sum it follows that the equilibrium set is convex and hence that (tˆA, tB)
is an equilibrium of the game too. But for sB − sA sufficiently large we have seen
that πA(tA, tB) is strictly concave in tA for every tB ∈ [0, 1] and it is thus impossible
that both tA and tˆA are best responses of A to B playing tB . That is, when sB − sA
sufficiently large an equilibrium in pure strategies exists and it is unique.
Step 3 (Characterization of the unique equilibrium) We take the derivative of the
payoff function of player A with respect to tA,
∂πA(tA, tB)
∂tA
= q × ∂ Fp(i p(tA, tB))
∂i p(tA, tB)
∂i p(tA, tB)
∂tA
+ (1 − q)
×∂ Fr (ir (tA, tB))
∂ir (tA, tB)
∂ir (tA, tB)
∂tA
,
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and we observe that for sB − sA sufficiently large it may be written as
∂πA(tA, tB)
∂tA
= q × ∂ Fp(i p(tA, tB))
∂i p(tA, tB)
× (m − M)(−1 + q) × w
′(m + (m − M)(−1 + q)tA)
−v′(i p(tA, tB) − sA) − v′(sB − i p(tA, tB))
+(1 − q) × ∂ Fr (ir (tA, tB))
∂ir (tA, tB)
× (m − M)q × w
′(M + (m − M)qtA)
−v′(ir (tA, tB) − sA) − v′(sB − ir (tA, tB)) .
Then,
∂πA(tA, tB)
∂tA
|tA=tB = q × f p
(
sA + sB
2
)
× (m − M)(−1 + q) × w
′(m + (m − M)(−1 + q)tA)
−2v′ ( sB−sA2
)
+(1 − q) × fr
(
sA + sB
2
)
(m − M)q × w′(M+(m−M)qtA)
−2v′ ( sB−sA2
)
= (m − M)q(1 − q)−2v′ ( sB−sA2
)
[
fr
(
sA + sB
2
)
w′(M + (m − M)qtA)
− f p
(
sA + sB
2
)
w′(m + (m − M)(−1 + q)tA)
]
.
Notice that
∂πA(tA, tB)
∂tA
|tA=tB=1 =
(m − M)q(1 − q)
−2v′ ( sB−sA2
) w′(M + (m − M)q)
[
fr
(
sA + sB
2
)
− f p
(
sA + sB
2
)]
.
Hence fr (
sA+sB
2 ) ≤ f p( sA+sB2 ) implies that ∂πA(tA,tB )∂tA |tA=tB=1 ≥ 0 (one can also
show that fr (
sA+sB
2 ) ≤ f p( sA+sB2 ) implies that ∂πB (tA,tB )∂tB |tA=tB=1 ≥ 0). This, along
with strict concavity of the players’ payoff functions in own strategies, suggests that
(1, 1) is the unique equilibrium.
Similarly, fr (
sA+sB
2 )w
′(M) ≥ f p( sA+sB2 )w′(m) implies that ∂πA(tA,tB )∂tA |tA=tB=0 ≤
0 (one can also show that fr (
sA+sB
2 )w
′(M) ≥ f p( sA+sB2 )w′(m) implies that
∂πB (tA,tB )
∂tB
|tA=tB=0 ≤ 0). As above, this, along with strict concavity of the players’
payoff functions in own strategies, suggests that (0, 0) is the unique equilibrium.
If none of these two inequalities hold, we observe that there exists a unique t∗ ∈
(0, 1) such that ∂πA(tA,tB )
∂tA
|tA=tB=t∗ = 0 and ∂πB (tA,tB )∂tB |tA=tB=t∗ = 0. This is because,
w′(M + (m − M)qt) is positive and increasing in t while w′(m + (m − M)(−1+q)t)
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is positive and decreasing in t . This t∗ ∈ (0, 1) should be such that fr ( sA+sB2 )w′(M +
(m − M)qt∗) = f p( sA+sB2 )w′(m + (m − M)(−1 + q)t∗).
Observing that t∗ is actually a function of the parameters of the model, implicit
differentiation of the latter expression gives us ∂t
∗
∂q > 0,
∂t∗
∂ f p(
sA+sB
2 )
> 0, and
∂t∗
∂ fr (
sA+sB
2 )
< 0. Finally, we observe that the equilibrium tax rate does not depend on
the exact values of sA and sB . Hence it is true that as long as the degree of candidate
differentiation sB − sA remains large enough for our equilibrium to exist, variations in
that degree do not affect equilibrium tax rate; t
∗
(sB−sA) = 0 for(sB −sA) sufficiently
small. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 3 When sA = sB a voter with income y votes for A when
w(y(1 − tA) + T (tA)) > w(y(1 − tB) + T (tB)), for B when w(y(1 − tB) +
T (tB)) > w(y(1 − tA) + T (tA)) and splits her vote between the two candidates
if w(y(1 − tA) + T (tA)) = w(y(1 − tB) + T (tB)) . By the fact that w(·) is strictly
increasing, it follows that if y = m we have
w(m(1 − tA) + T (tA)) > w(m(1 − tB) + T (tB)) ⇐⇒ tA > tB
w(m(1 − tB) + T (tB)) > w(m(1 − tA) + T (tA)) ⇐⇒ tB > tA
w(m(1 − tA) + T (tA)) = w(m(1 − tB) + T (tB)) ⇐⇒ tA = tB
while if y = M we have
w(M(1 − tA) + T (tA)) > w(M(1 − tB) + T (tB)) ⇐⇒ tA < tB
w(M(1 − tB) + T (tB)) > w(M(1 − tA) + T (tA)) ⇐⇒ tB < tA
w(M(1 − tA) + T (tA)) = w(M(1 − tB) + T (tB)) ⇐⇒ tA = tB .
That is all poor voters vote for the candidate who offers the highest tax rate and
all rich voters vote for the candidate who offers the lowest tax rate. Hence if q > 12
both candidates offer in equilibrium the highest possible tax rate, when q < 12 both
candidates offer in equilibrium the lowest possible tax rate and when q = 12 any
strategy profile is an equilibrium. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 4 To show why this proposition is true we start by studying how
i p(tA, tB) and ir (tA, tB) behave when the proposed tax rates change. Here one can
show that:
i p(tA, tB) = 1
2
+ −
√
(1 − q)tA + √(1 − q)tB
2(−1 + 2sA)
and that
ir (tA, tB) = 1
2
+ −
√
1 − qtA + √1 − qtB
2(−1 + 2sA) .
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In the special case in which tB = 1 we have that i p(tA, 1) ∈ [0, 1] if and only if:
tA ≥ tp = max
⎧
⎨
⎩
0,
−2 + q + 4sA − 4s2A
−1 + q − 2
√
−1 − 4sA + 4s
2
A
−1 + q
⎫
⎬
⎭
and ir (tA, 1) ∈ [0, 1] if and only if:
tA ≥ tr = max
{
0,
−1 + q + 4sA − 4s2A
q
−2
√
−−1+q+4sA − 4qsA − 4s
2
A + 4qs2A
q2
⎫
⎬
⎭
.
We observe that for q ≤ 12 it is always the case that tr ≤ tp.
This suggests that the payoff function of candidate A when candidate B is expected
to announce a tax rate tB = 1 is given by:
πA(tA, 1)
=
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
(1 − q) if tA < tr
(1 − q) ×
(
1
2 + −
√
1−qtA+√1−q
2(−1+2sA)
)
if tr ≤ tA < tp
(1 − q) ×
(
1
2 + −
√
1−qtA+√1−q
2(−1+2sA)
)
+ q ×
(
1
2 + −
√
(1−q)tA+√1−q
2(−1+2sA)
)
if tA ≥ tp
We observe that πA(tA, 1) is continuous and that
∂πA(tA,1)
∂tA
< 0 for tr < tA < tp
and that ∂πA(tA,1)
∂tA
> 0 for tA > tp; candidates for maxima are tA ∈ [0, tr ] and
tA = 1. We compute πA(0, 1) and πA(1, 1) and by routine algebra we establish that
πA(0, 1) < πA(1, 1) if and only if sA <
−1+2q
2q + 12
√
1−3q+3q2−q3
q2
. We can do the
same process for player B and show that πB(1, tB) < πB(1, 1) for any tB ∈ [0, 1)
if and only if sA <
−1+2q
2q + 12
√
1−3q+3q2−q3
q2
. This proves why the strategy profile
(tA, tB) = (1, 1) is a Nash equilibrium when sA < −1+2q2q + 12
√
1−3q+3q2−q3
q2
and
q ≤ 12 .
When q > 12 it is not always true that tr ≤ tp. If sA and q are such that tr ≤ tp
then the payoff function of A, when B is expected to play tB = 1, is the same as
before. We compute again πA(0, 1) and πA(1, 1) and by routine algebra we establish
that πA(0, 1) < πA(1, 1) for any sA ∈ [0, 12 ). As before this is enough to establish
that (tA, tB) = (1, 1) is a Nash equilibrium. When sA and q are such that tr > tp then
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the payoff function of A, when B is expected to play tB = 1, becomes:
πA(tA, 1)
=
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
(1 − q) if tA < tp
(1 − q)+q ×
(
1
2 + −
√
(1−q)tA+√1−q
2(−1+2sA)
)
if tp ≤ tA < tr
(1 − q) ×
(
1
2 + −
√
1−qtA+√1−q
2(−1+2sA)
)
+ q ×
(
1
2 + −
√
(1−q)tA+√(1−q)
2(−1+2sA)
)
if tA ≥ tr
We observe that πA(tA, 1) is continuous and that
∂πA(tA,1)
∂tA
> 0 for tp ≤ tA < tr
and that ∂πA(tA,1)
∂tA
> 0 for tA > tr ; the unique candidate for maximum is tA = 1.
Hence even if tr > tp, (tA, tB) = (1, 1) is a Nash equilibrium of the game. Notice that
when q > 12 we have that πA(0, 1) < πA(1, 1) for any sA <
1
2 .
To show that this is the unique equilibrium of the game, notice that our game is a
zero-sum game. That is, every equilibrium strategy is also a minimaximizer strategy.
But we have proved that for the cases (i) q ≤ 12 and sA < −1+2q2q + 12
√
1−3q+3q2−q3
q2
and (ii) q > 12 and sA <
1
2 the payoff function πA(tA, 1) (and πB(1, tB)) has a unique
maximum at tA = 1 (tB = 1). That is, no other minimaximizer strategy exists for
any of our players and, hence, no other (pure or mixed) equilibrium exists. The same
holds true for the corner case q ≤ 12 and sA = −1+2q2q + 12
√
1−3q+3q2−q3
q2
. But, an
extra argument is needed here in order for the uniqueness argument to be complete.
What is left to be proven is that for the rest of the parameter values, that is for
q ≤ 12 and sA ∈ (g(q), 12 ), there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. Notice that when
fr (x) = fr (sA + sB − x) and f p(x) = f p(sA + sB − x) (when the density of each of
the two distributions is symmetric about sA+sB2 ) we have that the game is symmetric
in game-theoretic terms. That is, πA(t˙, t¨) = πB(t¨, t˙) for any (t˙, t¨) ∈ [0, 1]2. This is
obviously the case here where both Fr and Fp are assumed to be uniform in [0, 1]. In a
symmetric zero-sum game, it is true that if an equilibrium in pure strategies exists then
a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies exists too. For q ≤ 12 and sA ∈ (g(q), 12 )we
already know that πA(0, 1) > πA(1, 1) and thus it follows that (tA, tB) = (1, 1) is not
a Nash equilibrium of the game. But can it be that (tA, tB) = (tˆ, tˆ) is an equilibrium
for tˆ < 1? Since sA = 1 − sB it should be true that in any profile (tA, tB) = (tˆ, tˆ) it
must hold that i p(tˆ, tˆ) = 12 and that ir (tˆ, tˆ) = 12 and that for (tA, tB) ∈ (tˆ − ε, tˆ + ε),
for ε > 0 sufficiently small, it should be the case that:
πA(tA, tB) = (1 − q) ×
(
1
2
+ −
√
1 − qtA + √1 − qtB
2(−1 + 2sA)
)
+ q ×
(
1
2
+ −
√
(1 − q)tA + √(1 − q)tB
2(−1 + 2sA)
)
.
We notice that for any tˆ < 1 it is true that ∂πA(tA,tB )
∂tA
|tA=tB=tˆ > 0 for any q ∈ (0, 1).
Hence no pure strategy equilibrium can exist for any sA ∈ [0, 12 ) and any q ∈ (0, 1)
apart from the strategy profile (tA, tB) = (1, 1). But as we argued for q ≤ 12 and
sA ∈ (g(q), 12 ) it is never the case that (tA, tB) = (1, 1) is an equilibrium. That is, for
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these parameter values the game does not admit a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
This completes the proof. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 5 The first part of this proposition is a direct corollary of Propo-
sition 2. When fr (
sA+sB
2 ) > f p(
sA+sB
2 ) we know from Proposition 2 and its proof
that a Nash equilibrium may exist only where ∂πA(tA,tB )
∂tA
|tA=tB = 0. By routine alge-
bra, we find that (tA, tB) such that tA = tB can satisfy this condition if and only if
tA = tB = t∗ = f p(
sA+sB
2 )
2
q f p(
sA+sB
2 )
2+(1−q) fr ( sA+sB2 )2
which is strictly larger than zero and
strictly smaller than one for any fr (
sA+sB
2 ) > f p(
sA+sB
2 ) and any q ∈ (0, 1). And
because we know that when sB − sA is large enough a unique equilibrium exists, the
identified symmetric strategy profile must be the unique equilibrium of the game. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 6 To prove this proposition, we complement formal arguments
with computational results. First notice that when Fp = N (0, z) and Fr = N (0, 1),
f p(0) ≥ fr (0) is equivalent to z ≤ 1. Now, for any value of z we have that πA(1, 1) =
1
2 (due to symmetry of the game) and that πA(tA, 1) is continuous. Moreover for any
pair (q, z) ∈ (0, 1) × (0, 1] we have that πA(tA, 1) < 12 .28 Hence when (q, z) ∈
(0, 1)× (0, 1] it is the case that πA(tA, 1) admits a unique global maximum at tA = 1.
The symmetric and zero-sum nature of the game ensures that for z ≤ 1 the strategy
profile (tA, tB) = (1, 1) is the unique Nash equilibrium of the game.
When z > 1, that is when fr (0) > f p(0), it is the case that
∂πA(tA,tB )
∂tA
|tA=tB=1 < 0
and that ∂πA(tA,tB )
∂tA
|tA=tB=0 > 0. It is, moreover, true that
∂πA(tA,
1
q+(1−q)z2 )
∂tA
|tA=t˚A(q,z) =
0 if and only if t˚A(q, z) = 1q+(1−q)z2 . Finally, computational results suggest that
when z > 1, it is the case that πA(tA, 1q+(1−q)z2 ) admits a unique global max-
imum and no local minimum. That is, for z > 1 the strategy profile (tA, tB) =
( 1
q+(1−q)z2 ,
1
q+(1−q)z2 ) is the unique Nash equilibrium of the game. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 7 In Step 1 of the proof of Proposition 2 we establish that,
when candidates are sufficiently differentiated, the payoff function of each candi-
date is strictly concave in own strategies for every strategy of the other candidate
and, hence, an equilibrium is guaranteed to exist. To this end we show that
∂2Fp(i p(tA,tB ))
∂i p(tA,tB )2
(
∂i p(tA,tB )
∂tA
)2 + ∂ Fp(i p(tA,tB ))
∂i p(tA,tB )
∂2i p(tA,tB )
∂t2A
< 0 for every (tA, tB) ∈ [0, 1]2
when sB−sA is sufficiently large. In this generalized framework,we can establish equi-
librium existence following the same strategy. That is, we can establish equilibrium
existence by showing that, when sB − sA is sufficiently large, then:
∂2Fp(i˚ p(tA, tB))
∂ i˚ p(tA, tB)2
(
∂ i˚ p(tA, tB)
∂tA
)2
+ ∂ Fp(i˚ p(tA, tB))
∂ i˚ p(tA, tB)
∂2 i˚ p(tA, tB)
∂t2A
< 0 for every (tA, tB) ∈ [0, 1]2.
28 Computational results supporting this claim are readily available.
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Considering without loss of generality that sB = −sA = s > 0, we have that
i˚ p(tA, tB) = wA,m (tA)−wB,m(tB )4s . This suggests that:
∂ i˚ p(tA, tB)
∂tA
= w
′
A,m(tA)
4s
and
∂2 i˚ p(tA, tB)
∂t2A
= w
′′
A,m(tA)
4s
.
Hence we have:
∂2Fp(i˚ p(tA, tB))
∂ i˚ p(tA, tB)2
(
∂ i˚ p(tA, tB)
∂tA
)2
+ ∂ Fp(i˚ p(tA, tB))
∂ i˚ p(tA, tB)
∂2 i˚ p(tA, tB)
∂t2A
= 1
s
[
∂2Fp(i˚ p(tA, tB))
∂ i˚ p(tA, tB)2
(w′A,m(tA))2
16s
+ ∂ Fp(i˚ p(tA, tB))
∂ i˚ p(tA, tB)
w
′′
A,m(tA)
4
]
.
By the fact thatw′A,m(t) is bounded form above and from below for every t ∈ [0, 1],
it follows that:
lim
s→+∞
[
∂2Fp(i˚ p(tA, tB))
∂ i˚ p(tA, tB)2
(w′A,m(tA))2
16s
+ ∂ Fp(i˚ p(tA, tB))
∂ i˚ p(tA, tB)
w
′′
A,m(tA)
4
]
= ∂ Fp(i˚ p(tA, tB))
∂ i˚ p(tA, tB)
w
′′
A,m(tA)
4
.
We observe that the latter is strictly negative for every (tA, tB) ∈ [0, 1]2. In other
words, when sB − sA is sufficiently large, the desired inequality holds and, subse-
quently, an equilibrium is guaranteed to exist. The uniqueness argument is identical
to Step 2 of the proof of Proposition 2.
In an interior equilibrium, (t∗A, t∗B), we should have
∂π˚A(tA,tB )
∂tA
|tA=t∗A,tB=t∗B = 0 and
∂π˚A(tA,tB )
∂tB
|tA=t∗A,tB=t∗B = 0. Simple algebraic manipulations of these two equalities
yield
w′A,m (t∗A)
w′A,M (t∗A)
= w
′
B,m (t
∗
B )
w′B,M (t∗B )
. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 8 In the equilibrium of the first society, we should have that
∂πA(tA,tB )
∂tA
|tA=t∗A,tB=t∗B = 0 which is equivalent to:
w′A,m(t∗A)
w′A,M (t∗A)
= (−1 + q) fr (i˚r (t
∗
A, t
∗
B))
q f p(i˚ p(t∗A, t∗B))
and in the equilibrium of the second society we should have that ∂πˆA(tA,tB )
∂tA
|tA=tˆ∗A,tB=tˆ∗B= 0 which is equivalent to:
w′A,m(tˆ∗A)
w′A,M (tˆ∗A)
= (−1 + qˆ) fˆr (i˚r (tˆ
∗
A, tˆ
∗
B))
qˆ fˆ p(i˚ p(tˆ∗A, tˆ∗B))
.
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We notice that:
∂
w′A,m (t)
w′A,M (t)
∂t
= w
′′
A,m(t)w
′
A,M (t) − w
′
A,m(t)w
′′
A,M (t)
(w′A,M (t))2
> 0, for every t ∈ [0, 1]
because wA,m is a strictly increasing and strictly concave function and wA,M is a
strictly decreasing and strictly concave function; and that:
lim
sB−sA→+∞
i˚r (tA, tB) = lim
sB−sA→+∞
i˚ p(tA, tB) = sB + sA
2
for every (tA, tB) ∈ [0, 1]2.
Hence limsB−sA→+∞ t∗A < limsB−sA→+∞ tˆ∗A holds if and only if
(−1+q) fr ( sB+sA2 )
q f p(
sB+sA
2 )
<
(−1+qˆ) fˆr ( sB+sA2 )
qˆ fˆ p(
sB+sA
2 )
. That is, if q = qˆ , limsB−sA→+∞ t∗A < limsB−sA→+∞ tˆ∗A holds if and
only if
fr (
sB+sA
2 )
f p(
sB+sA
2 )
>
fˆr (
sB+sA
2 )
fˆ p(
sB+sA
2 )
and if
fr (
sB+sA
2 )
f p(
sB+sA
2 )
= fˆr (
sB+sA
2 )
fˆ p(
sB+sA
2 )
, limsB−sA→+∞ t∗A <
limsB−sA→+∞ tˆ∗A holds if and only if qˆ > q. The argument for candidate B is sym-
metric. unionsq
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